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Abstract: Mortensen in [11] studies dual intuitionistic logic by dualizing topos
internal logic, but he did not study a sequent calculus. In this paper I present
a sequent calculus for complement-topos logic, which throws some light on the
problem of giving a dualization for LJ.
1  
“Dual intuitionistic logic” has been investigated to varying degrees of success
through different perspectives. McKinsey and Tarski in [8] studied it from an
algebraic point of view through the algebraic properties of “closure” or Brouw-
erian algebras, the algebraic duals to Heyting algebras.1 Curry in [2] presented
what he called “Skolem lattices”, which comprise “absolute implicational lat-
tices” and “absolute subtractive lattices”. Rauszer (cf. [14], [15]) used algebraic,
Hilbert-style and relational methods, but not Gentzen calculi, to investigate
“intuitionistic logic with dual operators”, “pseudo-difference” being the dual
to intuitionistic implication.
From then the problem of dualizing intuitionistic logic has been carried
out mostly in a proof-theoretic setting. Czermak in [3] investigated dual intu-
itionistic logic by restricting Gentzen’s LK to “singletons (at most) on the left”,
which is the natural dual notion to Gentzen’s “singletons (at most) on the right”
restriction for LJ. Goodman in [5] used Brouwerian algebras to investigate the
“logic of contradictions”, with special emphasis on the appropriate notion of a
conditional for dual intuitionistic logic. He also gave a sequent calculus for his
I wish to thank Prof. Chris Mortensen, Claudia Olmedo-García, Prof. Ivonne Pallares-Vega
as well as an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. Diagrams were
drawn using Paul Taylor’s diagrams package, v. 3.92.
1It is worth noting that they did that just for dualize them and study algebraic models of
intuitionistic logic.
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logic but did not investigate cut-elimination at all. Urbas [19] highlights several
deficiencies of Goodman’s and Czermak’s analyses and defines several Gentzen
calculi with the “singletons on the left” restriction, but added rules for incor-
porating within the same logic both implication and its dual and also proved
cut-elimination for his logics. Goré’s work [6] makes some remarks on Urbas’
proposals. Thus, the issue of dualizing LJ is far from settled and occasionally
new subtleties to deal with appear.
In [11, Ch. 11], Chris Mortensen, jointly with Peter Lavers, studies dual
intuitionistic logic by dualizing topos internal logic, which is an interesting ap-
proach to the issue of dualizing intuitionistic logic, although he did not study
a sequent calculus. In this paper I present a sequent calculus for complement-
topos logic, which throws some light on the dualization of LJ. In order to make
the paper as self-contained as possible, sections 2 and 3 are a fair bit of survey.
First, in section 2 I will present the essentials of the topos-theoretical charac-
terization of logical connectives.2 In section 3 I will describe briefly the theory
of complement-topoi, where logical connectives are characterized dually w.r.t
“standard” topoi, and present a concrete example, namely the dualization in
the category of graphs. Finally, in section 4 I will present a sequent calculus
for complement-topoi internal logic as well as one dual to LJ, which I compare
with other proposals of dualization of intuitionistic logic, especially Urbas’. My
aims are to show that Urbas’ criticisms to Goodman’s and Czermak’s attempts
of dualization are not conclusive, and to show that the dualization of the in-
ternal logic of a topos, based on a deep topological duality, favors dualizations
like that of Goodman.
2     
An (elementary) topos is a category with initial (0) and terminal (1) objects,
pullbacks, pushouts, exponentiation, and a subobject classifier, which is an object
Ω together with a morphism true such that for every monicm there is a unique
morphism χm which makes the following diagram a pullback:
S >
m
> A
1
!
∨
true
> Ω
χm
∨
χm is called “the characteristic or classifying morphism of m” and ! is the
unique morphism from S to 1 in C. A subobject classifier is unique up to
2I assume the reader is familiar with the essentials of category theory. One of the best
introductions is [9].
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isomorphism, and so the morphism χm.3 Propositions or truth-values are mor-
phisms ϕ : 1  ! Ω.
false : 1  ! Ω is the character of the initial object 0:
0
01
> 1
1
!
∨
true
> Ω
false =def. χ01
∨
where 01 is the only morphism from an initial object to a terminal one.
Any proposition ϕ has the following properties
false 6 ϕ ϕ 6 true
(if ‘6’ is interpreted as a deducibility relation then the above properties say
that every proposition is deducible from false, and that true is deducible from
every proposition).
In a topos, a n-ary connective k is a morphism k : Ωn  ! Ω. I will consider
just the more usual connectives, three binary (∧, conjunction; ∨, disjunction;
), implication) and a unary one (¬, negation) defined as follows:
Negation. Let be false : 1  ! Ω. Then ¬ : Ω  ! Ω is the only morphism
that makes the following diagram a pullback:
1
false
> Ω
1
!
∨
true
> Ω
¬ =def. χfalse
∨
That is, ¬ is the characteristic morphism of false. The negation of a proposi-
tion ϕ, denoted ¬ϕ, is defined as the composition ¬ϕ : 1  ! Ω. This defini-
tion implies that ¬ ϕ is the same morphism as true if and only if ϕ : 1  ! Ω
is the same morphism as false, said more briefly, ¬ϕ = true if and only if
ϕ = false.
Conjunction. Conjunction ∧ : Ω Ω  ! Ω is defined as the characteristic
morphism of htrue, truei : 1  ! Ω  Ω, i.e. ∧ : Ω  Ω  ! Ω is the only
morphism that makes the following diagram a pullback:
3 In the axiomatization of topoi, the requirement of the existence of such subobject classifier
is usually called “Ω-axiom”.
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1
htrue, truei
> ΩΩ
1
!
∨
true
> Ω
∧ =def. χhtrue,truei
∨
Given two propositions ϕ : 1  ! Ω and ψ : 1  ! Ω in a topos, the conjunc-
tion of ϕ and ψ, denoted ϕ∧ψ, is defined as ∧  htrue, truei : 1  ! Ω. This
implies that ϕ ∧ ψ is the same morphism as true if and only if both ϕ = true
and ψ = true. Said more briefly, (ϕ ∧ ψ) = true if and only if ϕ = true and
ψ = true.
Disjunction. Disjunction ∨ : Ω Ω  ! Ω is defined as the characteristic
morphism of [htrue, idΩi , hidΩ, truei], i.e. ∨ : Ω  Ω  ! Ω is the only
morphism that makes the following diagram a pullback:
Ω+Ω
[htrue, idΩi, hidΩ, truei]
> ΩΩ
1
!
∨
true
> Ω
∨ =def. χ[htrue, idΩi, hidΩ, truei]
∨
For any propositions ϕ and ψ, the proposition ϕ ∨ ψ is the composite mor-
phism ∨  hϕ,ψi : 1  ! Ω, where hϕ,ψi is the usual product morphism
hϕ,ψi : 1  ! Ω  Ω. Unlike negation or conjunction, a disjunction may
be the same morphism as true in several distinct ways, and the morphism
[htrue, idΩi , hidΩ, truei] : Ω + Ω  ! Ω  Ω synthesizes all those cases
(i.e. in order to get ∨  hϕ,ψi = true at least one of ϕ and ψmust be the same
morphism as true).
Implication. Implication ): Ω  Ω  ! Ω is defined as the characteristic
morphism of e : 6  ! Ω Ω, the equalizer of ∧ : Ω Ω  ! Ω and the first
projection p1, so it makes the following diagram a pullback:
6 >
e
> ΩΩ
1
!
∨
true
> Ω
) =def. χe
∨
This definition implies that (ϕ ) ψ) = true if and only if (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ϕ
(as can be noted, the equalizer e expresses the condition on the right: It equals
conjunction and the first projection). For any propositionsϕ andψ, the propo-
sition ϕ) ψ is the composite morphism ) hϕ,ψi : 1  ! Ω, where hϕ,ψi
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is the usual product morphism hϕ,ψi : 1  ! Ω  Ω. As in the case of dis-
junction, the characterization of implication synthetizes all the cases in which
(ϕ) ψ) = true.
The zero-order internal logic of a given topos E is the ‘algebra’ of morphisms
from a terminal object to the subobject classifier, collection of morphisms usu-
ally denoted as ‘E[1,Ω]’. There is a theorem establishing necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for a proposition ϕ being the same morphism as true in a
given topos E. Let ϕ |=E ψ denote that whenever the morphism ϕ is the same
morphism as true in E, so is ψ (|=E ϕ means that ϕ is the same morphism as
true in E), and let |=I be intuitionistic consequence relation. Then the follow-
ing theorem holds:
 1 For every topos E and propositionϕ, |=E ϕ if and only if |=I ϕ.
i.e. in general E[1,Ω] is a Heyting algebra. Quantifiers can also be dualized, as
is showed in [11, p. 112f] but for my present purposes it will suffice to consider
just zero-order logic.
Sound rules of inference can be given to characterize topos logic. A sequent
is an expression Γ : ϕ, where Γ is a finite (possibly empty) set of formulae and
ϕ is a formula. A sequent is true if and only if Γ does imply ϕ. When a sequent
Γ : ϕ is true we write
Γ ` ϕ
(for example, one has ¬¬ϕ ` ϕ in classical logic, but not in intuitionistic logic,
and one has ϕ,¬ϕ ` ψ in both classical and intuitionistic logic, but not in an
inconsistency-tolerant logic).
First are the structural rules. From the sequent(s) above the line one can
infer the one below. An asterisk shows that the sequent below follows from an
empty set of assumptions:
Trivial sequent: ϕ : ϕ
True and false: : true

false : ϕ
Γ : ϕThinning:
Γ, ψ : ϕ
Γ , ψ : ϕ and Γ : ψ
Cut:
Γ : ϕ
There is one reversible connective rule for each connective. From the se-
quent(s) above the double line one can infer the sequent below, and from the
one below one can infer the either of the two above:
Γ,ϕ : false
Γ : ¬ϕ
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Γ : ϕ and Γ : ψ
Γ : ϕ∧ψ
Γ , ϕ : θ and Γ , ψ : θ
Γ, ϕ∨ψ : θ
Γ,ϕ : ψ
Γ : ϕ) ψ
It is worth noting that the structural rule for false and the connective rules
for negation and disjunction are derived, just as the corresponding morphisms
false, ¬ and ∨ needed the other ones in order to be defined. The proof is
straightforward; see [9, Chapter 15].
Colin McLarty has rightly pointed out that the internal logic of a topos
coincides with no intuitionistic logic studied before topoi (cf. [9, p. vii] and
[10, pp. 153ff]). So, if the internal logic is different to intuitionistic logic, how
does its dualization have something to do with the issue of dual intuitionistic
logic? The internal logic strikingly resembles intuitionistic logic, indeed there
is no difference at the zero-order level. Differences lie at the higher-order level,
where traditional intuitionistic principles like the existence property (9xFx is
accepted only if for some constant c Fc is accepted) or the disjunction property
(accept a disjunctive statement ϕ∨ψ only if either ϕ or ψ is accepted) do not
hold. Thus, there would be no difference between zero-order dual internal
logic and zero-order dual intuitionistic logic. Nonetheless, there is an actual
difference in the rules since the internal logic of topoi lacks of some of the
structural rules and some connective rules do not match any connective rule
in LJ. However, if the internal logic of a topos can be dualized and a collection
of rules of inference for characterizing it can be given, it will throw some light
on how LJ should be dualized. Mortensen, in a joint work with Lavers, (cf. [11],
[12]) has showed that the internal logic of a topos can be presented in a dual
manner to the standard one. In the next section I will introduce complement-
topoi as suggested by Mortensen and Lavers.
3 -
A Heyting algebra can be thought of as a distributive lattice, with a bottom
element, ?, and an operator, ), satisfying the condition
(a∧ b) 6 c iff a 6 (b) c)
(thus ? ) ? defines the top element). ¬a is defined as a) ?.
Let T be a topological space. Then a standard example of a Heyting algebra
is the topological Heyting algebra hX,∧,∨,),?i, where X is the set of open
sets in T, ∧ and ∨ represent intersection and union, respectively, ? is ; and
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a ) b is (a ∨ b) (overlining denotes complementation and  the interior
operator of the topology). ¬a is a.
For finite sets of premises intuitionistic logic is sound and complete with
respect to the class of Heyting algebras. That is, α1, . . . , αn |= β iff for every
homomorphism h into such an algebra, h(α1, . . . , αn) 6 h(β).
The whole construction can be dualized in a natural way to give rise to an
inconsistency-tolerant or paraconsistent logic instead of a paracomplete one.
A dual Heyting algebra, or Brouwerian algebra, is a distributive lattice with a top
element, >, and an operation, −, which satisfies the following condition:
c 6 (a∨ b) iff (c− b) 6 a
(which makes > − > the bottom element). ¬a is defined as > − a. If T is a
topological space, then hX,∨,∧,−,>i, where X is the set of closed sets in T,
again ∧ and ∨ represent intersection and union, respectively, > is the whole
space and a−b is (a∧b)c (again overlining denotes complementation and c is
the closure operator of the topology). ¬a is ac.
The logic generated by Brouwerian algebras is dual to intuitionistic logic.
In particular, in intuitionistic logic one has (α ∧ ¬α) |= β and α |= ¬¬α, but
not β |= (α ∨ ¬α) nor ¬¬α |= α. Thus, in dual intuitionistic logic, or CSL,
“closed set logic”, as Mortensen ([11], [12]) calls it, one has β |= (α ∨ ¬α) and
¬¬α |= α, but not (α ∧ ¬α) |= β nor α |= ¬¬α. As it is well-known, a logic in
which (α ∧ ¬α) |= β does not hold is called “inconsistency-tolerant” or, more
usually, “paraconsistent”.
Roughly, to dualize a Heyting algebra any ocurrence of 6, >, ∧, ∨, >, ? on
a formula must be replaced by >, 6, ∨, ∧, ?, >, respectively. For dualizing )
things are slightly more complicated. In order to dualize a given formula a) b,
change the antecedent by the consequent and vice versa and then replace ) by
−.
Mortensen’s argument for developing an inconsistency-tolerant approach
to category theory does not rest on a sophisticated philosophical position, but
in that given that every topological space gives a topos (the category of pre-
sheaves on the space), mathematically
(. . . ) specifying a topological space by its closed sets is as natural
as specifying it by its open sets. So it would seem odd that topos
theory should be associated with open sets rather than closed sets.
Yet this is what would be the case if open set logic were the natural
propositional logic of toposes. At any rate, there should be a simple
‘topological’ transformation of the theory of toposes, which stands
to closed sets and their logic [i.e. inconsistency-tolerant], as topos
theory does to open sets and intuitionism. [11, p. 102]
If the duality between intuitionistic and CSL is as deep as topological, then a
representation of CSL as the internal logic of a topos should be equally natu-
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ral. In what follows I expound Mortensen and Lavers’s dualization of logical
connectives in a topos.4
A complement-classifier for a category C with terminal object is an object Ω
together with a morphism false such that for every monic m there is a unique
morphism χm which makes the following diagram a pullback:
S >
m
> A
1
!
∨
false
> Ω
χm
∨
χ is called “the complement-characteristic or complement-classifying morphism
of m” and ! is the unique morphism from S to 1 in C. A subobject classifier is
unique up to isomorphism, and so the morphism χ.
A complement-topos is a category with initial (0) and terminal (1) objects,
pullbacks, pushouts, exponentiation, and a complement-classifier. Now, the
morphism true : 1  ! Ω is the character of the initial object 0:
0
01
> 1
1
!
∨
false
> Ω
true =def. χ01
∨
where 01 is the only morphism from an initial object to a terminal one.
Negation, conjunction, disjunction and implication are dualized as follows5:
Negation. Let be true : 1  ! Ω. Then ¬ : Ω  ! Ω is the only morphism
that makes the following diagram a pullback:
1
true
> Ω
1
!
∨
false
> Ω
¬ =def. χtrue
∨
4Is is important to set their individual contributions. Of the ten diagrams in [11, Ch. 11],
Mortensen drew the first one and the final five, while Lavers drew the remaining four. In terms
of this paper, the first diagram of this section is due to Mortensen, those for true, negation,
conjunction, and disjunction are due to Lavers. The diagram for dual-implication never was
explicitly drawn, but it was discussed in [11, p. 109].
5Intuitively, the usual category-theoretic characterization of connectives says when a propo-
sition is true, while the dual says when it is false.
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That is, ¬ is the complement-characteristic morphism of true. The negation
of a proposition ϕ, denoted ¬ϕ, is defined as the composition ¬ ϕ : 1  ! Ω.
This definition implies that ¬ ϕ is the same morphism as false if and only if
ϕ : 1  ! Ω is the same morphism as true, said more briefly, ¬ϕ = false if and
only if ϕ = true.
Disjunction. Disjunction ∨ : Ω Ω  ! Ω is defined as the complement-
characteristic morphism of hfalse, falsei : 1  ! ΩΩ, i.e. ∨ : ΩΩ  ! Ω
is the only morphism that makes the following diagram a pullback:
1
hfalse, falsei
> ΩΩ
1
!
∨
false
> Ω
∨ =def. χhfalse,falsei
∨
Given two propositionsϕ : 1  ! Ω and ψ : 1  ! Ω in a topos, the disjunction
of ϕ and ψ, denoted ϕ ∨ ψ, is defined as ∨  hfalse, falsei : 1  ! Ω. This
implies that ϕ∨ψ is the same morphism as false if and only if both ϕ = false
and ψ = false. Said more briefly, (ϕ∨ ψ) = false if and only if ϕ = false and
ψ = false. Compare with Set, where the complement of {(0, 0)} in 2  2 is
{(1, 1) , (1, 0) , (0, 1)}.
Conjunction. Conjunction ∧ : Ω Ω  ! Ω is defined as the complement-
characteristic morphism of [hfalse, idΩi , hidΩ, falsei], i.e. ∧ : ΩΩ  ! Ω
is the only morphism that makes the following diagram a pullback:
Ω+Ω
[hfalse, idΩi, hidΩ, falsei]
> ΩΩ
1
!
∨
false
> Ω
∧ =def. χ[hfalse, idΩi, hidΩ, falsei]
∨
A conjunction may be the same morphism as false in several ways, unlike nega-
tion or disjunction and the morphism
[hfalse, idΩi , hidΩ, falsei] : Ω + Ω  ! Ω  Ω
synthetizes all those cases. The composition
∧  [hfalse, idΩi , hidΩ, falsei] : Ω + Ω  ! Ω
expresses in a condensed form all those combinations of propositions ϕ, ψ
such that their conjunction is the same morphism as false (for a conjunction
being the same morphism as false it suffices that at least one of ϕ or ψ be the
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same morphism as false). Compare again with Set, where the complement of
conjunction is {(1, 0) , (0, 1) , (0, 0)}.
Dual-implication, sustraction or pseudo-difference. Pseudo-difference
− : Ω  Ω  ! Ω
is defined as the characteristic morphism of e : >  ! Ω  Ω, where e is
the equalizer of ∨ : Ω Ω  ! Ω and the first projection p1, so it makes the
following diagram a pullback:
> >
e
> ΩΩ
1
!
∨
false
> Ω
− =def. χe
∨
This is the right topos-theoretic dualization of the definition of implication
given above. Remember that (ϕ ) ψ) = true if and only if (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ϕ, and
it is dualized (ψ−ϕ) = false if and only if (ϕ∨ψ) = ϕ, which is expressed by
the pullback above.
Dualization of implication is a delicate matter, though. To begin with,
implication in usual topos theory may be defined in several ways, for example
by considering it the characteristic morphism of e 0 :6 ! ΩΩ, the equalizer
of disjunction and the second projection, which would lead to several different
dualizations. Goodman proved that in CSL no connective definable in terms
of the connectives ∧,∨,¬,− has > as semantic assignment iff the assignment
of its antecedent is less or equal than the assignment of its consequent. Some
authors argue that a connective like − cannot be regarded as an implication at
all, since (ϕ − ϕ) = false for every ϕ and does not satisfy modus ponens, that
CSL lacks of a reasonable implication and therefore it is not a serious logic and
much less a logic strong enough for developing some mathematics based on it.
Certainly − might not be regarded as an implication, in the same way that the
dual of conjunction is not even a kind of conjunction. − should be regarded
rather as an “anti-implication”, as Popper once suggested (cf. [13]).
Mortensen has argued against this alleged deficiency of CSL. He points out
that it is not clear how much of mathematics depends on an object-language
implication. What mathematics needs, he says, is a deducibility relation, but
that is provided by ordering and an adequate proof theory; Goodman himself
proved that derivability in CSL respects the natural semantic ordering of set
inclusion.6 Moreover, nothing in the above rules out the possibility of defin-
ing a reasonable implication in CSL or in complement-topos theory. That an
6This is a controversial point. Mortensen thinks that functionality is mathematically prior
to, and a more important matter than some logical notions. Someone might object to this by
saying that ordinary math books use implication constantly, and for example use definitions
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implication cannot be defined in terms of the other connectives is not a strong
argument; after all connectives in, e.g. intuitionistic logic are not interdefin-
able and it is not thought of as defective. Mortensen proposed an implication
for complement-topoi which, however, should not be regarded necessarily as a
dualization of usual implication, but a more general case. I will discuss it in the
following section.
It is clear that if E is a topos and E 0 is the category obtained by renam-
ing true as false and defining dually the connectives then E 0 is again a topos,
since terminal and initial objects, pullbacks, pushouts, and exponentials are
notions and constructions prior to the characterization of subobject classifiers
and connectives. Moreover, Mortensen proved the following
 2 (Duality Theorem) S is true in E if and only if S’ is true in E 0.
Let me present a simple example on how the dualization works in a con-
crete topos. S## is the category of (irreflexive directed multi-)graphs.7 Its sub-
object classifier ΩS## has three truth-values with the order 0A ﬃ (st) ﬃ A (0A
and A are false and true in S##, respectively) and negation gives the following
identities of morphisms:
¬A = 0A, ¬(
s
t) = 0A, ¬0A = A
Since (ϕ) ψ) = true if and only if (ϕ∧ψ) = ϕ, in general (¬¬ϕ ) ϕ) 6= A
in S## because even though (¬ ¬ ϕ ) ϕ) = A when ϕ = A or ϕ = 0A,
(¬ ¬ ϕ ∧ ϕ) 6= ¬ ¬ ϕ when ϕ = (st). Given that (¬ ¬ ϕ ) ϕ) 6= A but
there is no formula Φ such that Φ = true in classical logic and Φ = false in
intuitionistic logic, (¬¬ϕ) ϕ) = (st) when ϕ = (st). Moreover, ϕ∨¬ϕ fails to
be the same morphism asA, since (ϕ∨ψ) = true if and only if either ϕ = true
or ψ = true. If ϕ = (st), ¬ϕ = 0A, so neither ϕ = A nor ¬ϕ = A and hence
(ϕ∨ ¬ϕ) 6= A. Thus, the internal logic of S## is not classical.
Complement-S## has the same three truth-values with its original order,
but (complement) negation gives now the following identities of morphisms:
¬0A = A, ¬(
s
t) = A, ¬A = 0A
In S## one has (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) 6= A, and dualizing one obtains (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) 6= 0A.
Remember that in a complement-topos (ϕ ∧ ψ) = false if and only if either
ϕ = false or ψ = false. If ϕ = (st), ¬ϕ = A, so neither ¬ϕ = 0A nor ϕ 6= 0A
and hence (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) 6= 0A. Besides, in a Heyting algebra (like the algebra
E[1,Ω]) in general it is not the case that ψ 6 (ϕ ∨ ¬ ϕ), which dualized
gives that in general it is not the case that (ϕ∧¬ϕ) 6 ψ. So, the internal logic
of complement-S## is not classical, but inconsistency-tolerant. Moreover, in
stated as conditionals so that one constantly quantifies into conditional contexts, and every
time one proves some object does not have a defined property one is negating a conditional.
Seemingly this cannot all be pushed into the metalanguage without severe contortions.
7Nice introductions to this category can be found in [21] and [7].
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complement-S## both ϕ∨¬ϕ and ¬(ϕ∧¬ϕ) are the same morphism as A. In
S## (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 0A, which dualized is (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) = A. In S## ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) = 0A
(since in intuitionistic logic the negation of a classical theorem is always false),
and dualization gives ¬(ϕ∧ ¬ϕ) = A.
Since classical logic is its own dual, the internal logic of e.g. Set is not
modified by this dualization, so the complement-classifier is indistinguishable
(via categorial methods) from a standard subobject classifier. Thus, as Vasyukov
([20] p. 292) points out: “(. . . ) in Set we always have paraconsistency because
of the presence of both types of subobject classifiers (. . . )” just as we always
have in it (at least) intuitionistic logic.8
4     -   
    
Just as the dualization of connectives in a topos, the rules for complement-
topoi logic also mirrors the “topologico-algebraic” dualization. That is, any
ocurrence of ∧, ∨, true, false on a formula must be replaced by ∨, ∧, false,
true, respectively. To dualize a given formula a ) b, replace the antecedent
by the consequent and vice versa and then replace ) by −. Since a 6 b can be
interpreted as a sequent a : b and the dual of a 6 b is b 6 a (or a > b), the dual
of a : b is b : a.9 Thus, the corresponding rules for complement-topoi logic are
the following ones:
Structural Rules:
Trivial sequent: ϕ : ϕ
False and true:
false :

ϕ : true
ϕ : ΓThinning:
ϕ : Γ, ψ
ϕ : Γ , ψ and ψ : Γ
Cut:
ϕ : Γ
Connective rules:
true : Γ,ϕ
¬ϕ : Γ
8The presence of paraconsistency within classical logic is not news. See for example [1]
where some paraconsistent negations in S5 and first-order classical logic are defined.
9Such dualization is (the zero-order part of ) the mapping ? discussed in [19, p. 444], which
builds upon one described in [3].
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ϕ : Γ and ψ : Γ
ϕ∨ψ : Γ
θ : Γ , ϕ and θ : Γ , ψ
θ : Γ,ϕ∧ψ
ψ : Γ,ϕ
ψ−ϕ : Γ
Dually to the case of topoi, the structural rule for true and the connective rules
for negation and conjunction are derived, just as the corresponding morphisms
true, ¬ and ∧ needed false and ∨ in order to be defined.
Finally, let us compare this dualization with other attempts, especially that
of Urbas (cf. [19]). Urbas tries to “rectify” previous works by Czermak and
Goodman on the formulation of dual intuitionistic logic. These authors of-
fered sequent calculi which are (at most) singular in the left, but neither uses
Gentzen’s original connectives (negation, conjunction, disjunction and impli-
cation). Czermak’s logic lacks dual rules for implication, while Goodman did
not use negation and employs pseudo-difference and the constant >, and for
this Urbas says that “[c]onsequently, it is not immediately clear in what exact
sense each is dual to intuitionistic logic LJ.” His proposal of dualization of LJ is
the following set of rules, which Urbas calls “LDJ”:
Structural Rules
Identity ϕ : ϕ
: ΓThinning :
ϕ : Γ
ϕ : Γ: Thinning
ϕ : Γ, ψ
ϕ : Γ, ψ, θ, ∆: Exchange
ϕ : Γ, θ, ψ, ∆
ϕ : Γ, ψ, ψ: Contraction
ϕ : Γ, ψ
ϕ : Γ , ψ and ψ : ∆
Cut
ϕ : Γ, ∆
Connective rules
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: Γ,ϕ¬ :
¬ϕ : Γ
ϕ : Γ: ¬
: Γ, ¬ϕ
ψ : Γ
∧ :
ϕ∧ψ : Γ
ϕ : Γ
ϕ∧ψ : Γ
θ : Γ , ϕ and θ : Γ , ψ
: ∧
θ : Γ, ϕ∧ψ
ϕ : Γ and ψ : Γ
∨ :
ϕ∨ψ : Γ
θ : Γ, ϕ: ∨
θ : Γ, ϕ∨ψ
θ : Γ, ψ
θ : Γ, ϕ∨ψ
: Γ , ϕ and ψ : ∆
) :
ϕ) ψ : Γ, ∆
ϕ : Γ: )
: Γ, ϕ) ψ
θ : Γ, ψ
θ : Γ, ϕ) ψ
All these rules satisfy the “singletons in the left” restriction, a necessary
condition to dualize intuitionistic logic. Urbas says:
Most of the rules of LDJ require no comment, as they are sim-
ply the result of restricting the rules of Gentzen’s classical sequent
system LK to being (at most) singular in the antecedent. The only
exception is the pair of rules [(:))]. [19, p. 442]
I think that one of the most natural ways to obtain a dual intuitionistic
logic is by means of the “topologico-algebraic dualization” mentioned above.
Urbas himself regards that dualization as “(. . . ) a more precise way of estab-
lishing the correspondences between intuitionistic and dual-intuitionistic log-
ics and their fragments.”[19, p. 445] Nonetheless, he defends LDJ as a more
accurate dualization and gives three main reasons for that:
1. First, LDJ can be regarded as dual, he says, since it satisfies the “singletons
(at most) in the antecedent” restriction;
2. it is more accurate in that a dual Glivenko theorem holds for it10, and
3. it is more accurate for it is formulated with the same connectives as LJ.
But the topologico-algebraic dualization does provide an account of both
why and how to obtain those particular dual rules as well as an account of the
restriction itself: The singletons in the left restriction arises since the dual of
an intuitionistically admissible sequent Γ : ∆, which always will be at most sin-
gleton in the right, is ∆ : Γ , which in its turn will always be at most singleton
in the left. On the other hand, there seems to be nothing in the notion of du-
alization which forces the dual of a connective to be one of the same kind, i.e.
nothing in the notion of dualization seems to force, for example, a dual con-
junction be also a conjunction or a dual implication an implication. Finally, the
10That is, LDJ shares all sentential theorems but not counter-theorems with LK.
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fact that LDJ satisfies the dual Glivenko property of having the same sentential
theorems as LK does not make it better than other dualizations, since it can
be proved that they have properties that can be also regarded as dual Glivenko
properties; see for example [6]. Now, let us take a closer look at the desideratum
“you shall dualize using the same connectives”.
Urbas criticizes Goodman’s and Czermak’s proposals because it is not im-
mediately clear in what exact sense each is dual to intuitionistic logic LJ.” But
Urbas’ LDJ also lacks “immediate clarity” as dual to LJ on looking carefully at
the rule :), since according to the method employed with the other connec-
tives it should be
ϕ : Γ, ψ: )
: Γ, ϕ) ψ
and not the more complex pair of Urbas’ : ). Urbas tries to explain his for-
mulation by appealling to the differences of deductive strength whether “Ke-
tonen” or “non-Ketonen” rules are used. A rule for the introduction of a given
binary connective is called non-Ketonen if above the line appears just one of the
formulae connected. Classical logic LK can be formulated indifferently using
Ketonen or non-Ketonen rules for introducing conjunction in the antecedent
and disjunction or conjunction in the consequent. The difference becomes
crucial only when, as in LJ and its dual, restrictions to singularity are consid-
ered. “Accordingly, Gentzen formulated LK using [non-Ketonen] so as to be
able to obtain LJ by imposing this restriction.” For example, only non-Ketonen
rules for introducing disjunction in the consequent can be restricted to singu-
larity as required for intuitionistic logic. Similarly, only non-Ketonen rules for
introducing conjunction in the antecedent can be restricted to singularity as
required for LDJ. “(. . . ) happily, Gentzen also used these rules in formulating
LK.”[19, p. 442]
But Gentzen did not use non-Ketonen rules for introducing implication,
since the usual Ketonen rules for implication are easily restricted to singularity
in the consequent as required in order to formulate intuitionistic logic, and are
also easily restricted to singularity in the consequent as required in order to
formulate dual intuitionistic logic. Why the usage of the same connectives is
required, but not of the same kind of rules for each connective? Urbas claims
that dualization is involved here too. LJ is formulated using a Ketonen rule for
implication, and the non-Ketonen rules can be derived. Nonetheless, if LJ is
formulated using the non-Ketonen rules then the Ketonen rule cannot be de-
rived. Dually, if LDJ is formulated using the non-Ketonen rules for implication,
the Ketonen rules can be derived, but if LDJ is formulated using the Ketonen
rule the non-Ketonen rules cannot be derived. Thus, the use of non-Ketonen
rules for implication is a matter of deductive strength. But all this is too much
problematic for a defense of LDJ as a more accurate and immediately clearer
dualization than Czermak’s and Goodman’s. Urbas does not provide a single
account of how dualization is going to be done. He says that the “singletons (at
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most) in the left” restriction in LK dualizes LJ, but he does not merely apply this
method to implication. He asks for usage of Gentzen’s original connectives and
he is happy with Gentzen’s use of non-Ketonen rules for conjunction, which
facilitates dualization, but he is lead to alter Gentzen’s presentation since du-
alizing the original Ketonen rule for implication gives lesser deductive power
to dual intuitionistic logic than expected. Moreover, Urbas does not provide
any reason in order to connect dualization, in one hand, and the “necessity” to
modify the kind of rule for implication, on the other. I do not claim that LDJ
is not the correct dualization of LJ, if such a thing exists. I am only claiming
that Urbas’ arguments to this effect are not very compelling, and much less as
criticisms to previous attempts.
The topologico-algebraic dualization underlying the dualization of the in-
ternal logic of a topos gives an important hint on how to dualize clearly and
directly LJ. Following that dualization, dual LJ would be especified through the
following rules:
Structural Rules
Identity ϕ : ϕ
: ΓThinning :
ϕ : Γ
ϕ : Γ: Thinning
ϕ : Γ, ψ
ϕ : Γ, ψ, θ, ∆: Exchange
ϕ : Γ, θ, ψ, ∆
ϕ : Γ, ψ, ψ: Contraction
ϕ : Γ, ψ
ϕ : Γ , ψ and ψ : ∆
Cut
ϕ : Γ, ∆
Connective rules
: Γ,ϕ¬ :
¬ϕ : Γ
ϕ : Γ: ¬
: Γ, ¬ϕ
ϕ : Γ and ψ : Γ
∨ :
ϕ∨ψ : Γ
θ : Γ, ϕ: ∨
θ : Γ, ϕ∨ψ
θ : Γ, ψ
θ : Γ, ϕ∨ψ
ψ : Γ
∧ :
ϕ∧ψ : Γ
ϕ : Γ
ϕ∧ψ : Γ
θ : Γ , ϕ and θ : Γ , ψ
: ∧
θ : Γ, ϕ∧ψ
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ψ : ϕ, Γ
− :
ψ−ϕ : Γ
ϕ : Γ , and θ : ψ, ∆: −
θ : ψ−ϕ, Γ, ∆
It remains problematic whether dual intuitionistic logic has a reasonable
implication. The evidence is overwhelming against the existence of an im-
plication in dual intuitionistic logic, but no argument seems to be conclusive.
However, I think that this issue has received more attention than it deserves.
As Mortensen has pointed out, the deducibility relation, so important for a
logic, is provided in this case by the proof theory and/or by an order relation.
Nonetheless, Mortensen thinks that there is a “simple and reasonable” impli-
cation on any (bounded) lattice, namely (ϕ )M ψ) = true if ϕ 6 ψ and
(ϕ )M ψ) = false otherwise, and gives a categorial representation of it (cf.
[11, pp. 10ff]). This implication is a different connective to standard implica-
tion in a topos. As is well known, ¬ ¬ ϕ ) ϕ is not an intuitionistic theorem.
Let us consider again the category S## of (irreflexive directed multi-)graphs.
Since ¬¬ϕ is not generally lesser or equal than ϕ, (¬ ¬ ϕ ) ϕ) = false. But
this cannot be, since there is no (zero-order) formula Φ such that Φ = true
in classical logic and Φ = false in intuitionistic logic. So, standard topos im-
plication is not Mortensen’s S5-style implication. Moreover, there seems to be
other reasonable implications on any lattice, for example
(ϕ)A ψ) = false iff ϕ is greater than ψ;
(ϕ)B ψ) = false iff ϕ = true and ψ = false.
I leave the discussion of these implications and their categorial description as
well as a more detailed discussion of implication in dual intuitionistic logic for
further work.
5 
I have expounded the essentials of theory of complement-topoi, whose inter-
nal logic is dual to that of standard topoi. I introduced a sequent calculus
for complement-topos logic, which follows Mortensen’s topologico-algebraic
inspired dualization of truth morphisms. Even though the sequent calculus
corresponding to the internal logic of a topos is not exactly LJ, its dualiza-
tion can be applied straightforwardly to LJ. On this ground, I examined Ur-
bas’ arguments against other attempts of dualization of LJ, quite similar to the
topologico-algebraic based dualization expounded here, and I showed that Ur-
bas’ LDJ has not clear advantages over the proposals he criticized.
There are several open problems concerning dualization in topos theory,
but there are two which deserve especial attention. First, even though truth-
morphisms, including quantifiers, can be dualized, there is no obvious way on
how does it sit with the Cartesian closedness of a topos, i.e. it seems that both
type theory and higher-order logic remain unchanged for complement-topoi
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since Cartesian closedness is independent of the classifier and dualization. Sec-
ond, there seems to be other reasonable implications besides the standard one
present in any topos, be it a standard or a complement-topos. What is their
categorial representation, through diagrams for example?
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